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THE DECLINE OF NEGATIVE IMPLICATION
JURISPRUDENCE: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN
PRISON DISCIPLINE AFTER SANDIN v. CONNER
James E. Robertsont
I. INTRODUCTION
Once the prison gate closes, one enters an authoritarian, "total institu-
tion."' Courts, however, no longer regard inmates as "slaves of the state."2
Consequently, inmates can exercise certain enumerated constitutional rights?
t Professor of Corrections, Mankato State University (Minnesota State University System). B.A., 1972,
University of Washington; J.D., 1975, Washington University; M.A., 1979, California State University; Dipl.
in Law, 1988, Oxford University.
1. Prisons are "total institutions:"
The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the barriers ordinarily
separating... three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and
under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in
the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do
the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled .... Finally,
the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to
fulfill the official aims of the institution.
ERVING GoFirtAN, ASYLUms 6 (1961).
The nature of imprisonment severely constrains the staff's control of inmates. First, control through
physical force or the threat thereof is often ineffective. Second, there are few rewards or punishments that can
be handed out to inmates that will impact them in a meaningful way. Third, because of the involuntarily na-
ture of imprisonment, inmates are unlikely to respond to appeals to morality or duty. Finally, the very willing-
ness of staff to use their authority is corrupted by several factors, including the social pressures to be a "good
Joe" and the dependence on inmates to perform various housekeeping functions. See GRESHAM M. SYKES,
THE SOCIETY OF CAPIrvas 48-58 (1958).
Because of these limitations, staff members enlist the support of inmates to achieve "surface" order.
See ROBERT G. LEGER & JOHN R. STRATrON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CORRECTIONs: A BOOK OF READINGS 120
(1977) (identifying three informal patterns of social accommodation: over goods and services, information,
and status); Jim Thomas, Some Aspects of Negotiated Order, Loose Coupling and Mesostructure in Maximum
Security Prisons, 7 SYMBOLIC INTERACrION 213, 221 (1984) (observing that informal agreements between
inmates and staff lead to relaxed rule enforcement).
2. Prior to the twentieth century, courts regarded prisoners as "slave[s] of the state" and thus lacking
civil rights. Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 1024, 1026 (1871). Prisoners would have to await
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945), to achieve their modem
constitutional status. In ruling that the writ of habeas corpus can be used to challenge conditions of confine-
ment, the Coffin court declared that prisoners possess the same rights as free citizens excepting those incom-
patible with incarceration. See Coffin, 143 F.2d at 445.
3. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (protection from inmate violence); O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (limited religious freedom); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
(limited protection from censorship); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (limited protection from search
1
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Inmates also enjoy constitutional liberty4 and its attendant procedural safe-
guards under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' While prison staff can lawfully deprive inmates of constitutional liber-
ty, such deprivation must be preceded by "some kind of hearing"6 to prevent
erroneous or arbitrary decisions.'
On several occasions during the past three decades, the United States Su-
preme Court has defined the liberty interests of inmates.' The Court's most
recent explication came in the 1994-95 term in Sandin v. Conner.9 The Court,
in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, abandoned the methodology
through which the grammatical composition of state prison regulations had
become the basis for deriving constitutionally protected liberty interests.'" In
its place, the Court utilized a liberty-defining standard that achieved analytical
symmetry at the cost of procedural fairness in the prison's internal "justice" system."
and seizure); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (limited right of
association); Estelle v. Gamble, 428 U.S. 97 (1976) (right to medical care).
4. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that psychotropic drugs cannot be
administered without an inmate's consent in the absence of certain findings); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980) (holding that procedural safeguards required before transferring inmate to mental hospital); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that major disciplinary sanctions must be preceded by procedural
safeguards).
5. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth
Amendment includes a similar provision that applies only to actions of the federal government. See Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). Because the Bill of Rights is not applicable to the
states by virtue of the Barron case, state inmates must look to the Fourteenth Amendment for due process
protection. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Due Process Clause in this Article refer to the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fifth Amendment, because the vast majority of inmates reside in state
prisons. See BUREAU OF JUSTC E STATIsTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICS-1994 at 547
tbl.6.25 (1995) (89,587 federal prisoners compared with 857,359 state prisoners as of Dec. 31, 1993).
6. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1975) (discussing Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)).
7. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 114-25 (1978) (discussing purposes of due process).
8. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454 (1989); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983);
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
9. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
10. Id. at 2300-01.
11. Id. Inmates' lives are regulated by official rules of conduct. Some of these prohibitions are malum in
se and mirror criminal offenses, but the great bulk of prohibitions have no counterpart in the criminal law.
Prohibitions that do not have criminal counterparts are peculiar to life in total institutions, where prisoners are
stripped of their autonomy and subjected to constant surveillance.
The prison's rules of conduct are often ambiguous. Conduct codes contain such "wastebasket" offens-
es as threatening institutional security, unruliness, and disrespect. Moreover, many codes do not define listed
offenses. See James E. Robertson, "Catchall" Prison Rules and the Courts: A Study of Judicial Review of
Prison Justice, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 153, 170-72 (1994) [hereinafter Robertson, "Catchall" Prison
Rules]. Ambiguous disciplinary rules fail to give inmates adequate notice of punishable behavior, leaving staff
with extensive discretion in rule enforcement. Id. at 153. Their uncertain content may also contribute to the
pronounced disparity between inmate and staff defimitions of prohibited conduct. See John D. Hewitt et. al.,
Self-Reported and Observed Rule-Breaking in Prison: A Look at Disciplinary Response, 1 JUST. Q. 435, 443
(1985).
Disciplinary procedures come into play when a correctional officer "writes-up" or charges an inmate
with a rule violation. Charging is discretionary, with staff overlooking many violations. See id. at 445. The
Bureau of Criminal Statistics reported that just over half of all state prisoners faced disciplinary charges dur-
2
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This article critiques the Court's new methodology for identifying inmate
liberty interests. Part I reviews earlier methodologies advanced by the Court.
Part II summarizes the Sandin decision. Part I explores the implications of the
Court's ruling for correctional staff and inmates. Part IV proposes a liberty-
defining standard grounded in common law and illustrated by a watershed rul-
ing of England's Court of Appeal. Concluding remarks follow.
II. LIBERTY BEFORE SANDIN V. CONNER
In 1968, inmate Martin Sostre, a jail house lawyer and black activist, spent
a year in segregation for activities that his warden viewed as disruptive. 2 Pris-
on officials failed to accord Sostre even rudimentary due process before impos-
ing such harsh discipline. 3 Indeed, prison officials customarily meted out arbi-
ing the course of their confinement. In 1986 there were 1.5 violations per inmate. Males were more likely to
be charged than females. A greater percentage of non-Hispanic blacks (57%) faced disciplinary charges than
non-Hispanic whites (51%) and Hispanics (47%). Younger inmates had the most disciplinary violations. See
JAMES STEPHAN, PRISON RULE VIOLATORS 1-2 (1989).
There have been three approaches to staffing disciplinary tribunals. Historically, custody officers adju-
dicated charges. A more recent approach utilizes beth custody and treatment personnel appointed by the war-
den. A third model consists of a single hearing officer supervised by the commissioner of corrections rather
than a particular warden. See generally James E. Robertson, Impartiality and Prison Disciplinary Tribunals,
17 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 326-29 (1991) [hereinafter Robertson, Impartiality] (dis-
cussing the several variations of staffing disciplinary bodies). Courts have given correctional authorities wide
latitude in determining the composition of disciplinary tribunals. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
tribunals staffed by the prison's own officers face "obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor
of the institution .... " Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985). Even in the light of such pressure,
the Court has not found their use unconstitutional. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974). A line
of cases do forbid institutional employees from hearing charges that they witnessed, wrote-up, investigated, or
otherwise had substantial involvement. See, e.g., Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 1987); Adams
v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1984); Willoughby v. Luster, 717 F. Supp. 1439, 1441 (D. Nev.
1989).
The Supreme Court, in Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), decreed that inmates threatened with
deprivation of a major liberty interest are entitled to the following procedural safeguards: (1) notification of
the charges no later than twenty-four hours before their adjudication; (2) assistance by a staff member, inmate
or some other "counsel substitute" for illiterate defendants or for those persons facing complex accusations;
(3) production of witnesses for the accused unless their presence would be "unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals;" and (4) an explanation of a guilty verdict. Id. at 563-70.
The burden of proof is normally satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. See Charles H. Jones Jr.
& Edward Rhine, Due Process and Prison Disciplinary Practices: From Wolff To Hewitt, 11 N. ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 44, 90 (1985). Over ninety percent of the cases end in convictions. See
STEPHAN, supra, at 1. Not surprisingly, inmates refer to these proceedings as "kangaroo courts." "The name
implies an inmate is quickly in and out without any real justice taking place." See WILLIAM K. BENTLEY &
JAMES M. CORBErr, PRISON SLANG 11 (1992).
Virtually all states permit inmates to grieve disciplinary sanctions. William Babcock, Due Process in
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 22 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1084 (1981). The grievance process typically autho-
rizes the warden and the commissioner of corrections to overturn or modify the disciplinary tribunal's dispo-
sition of a case. Inmates question the impartiality of administrative appeals. See Bruce R. Jacob & K. M.
Sharma, Disciplinary and Punitive Transfer Decisions and Due Process Values in the American Correctional
System, 12 STETSON L. REv. 1, 120 (1982).
12. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
13. Sostre, 312 F. Supp. at 867.
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trary sanctions. 4 They could do so as long as the federal courts abided by the
"hands-off' doctrine, a judicial policy of nonintervention in prison matters."5
Fortunately for inmate Sostre, his segregation occurred during a sea change
in the legal status of inmates. By the late 1960s, federal courts had begun to
repudiate the "hands-off" doctrine. 6 Similarly, the federal district court in
14. As one scholar has stated:
Historically, the management of prison business has been centered around the personal goals and
powers of the warden and a deputy warden or principal keeper who served as chief disciplinarian and
top security officer. Literature describing early prison wardens presents the image of autocratic, some-
times charismatic figures who commanded the obedience and loyal of rank and file custodians. Until
the courts abandoned their hands-off policy, wardens and their deputies held nearly unlimited authori-
ty to administer their own system of punishments and rewards.
JAMES Fox, ORGA.NZTIONAL AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN MAXIMUM-SEcuTrrY PRISONS 13 (1982) (footnotes
omitted). See also Bruce R. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 244
(1970) ("There exists an almost complete absence of meaningful procedural protections... in such hear-
ings."); William D. Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for Specific
Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D. L. REv. 309, 314 (1973) ("Even if procedures exist, and even if they are
followed, the prisoner's chances of receiving a fair hearing are extremely poor. In many instances, a hearing
is never held and punishment is imposed by an individual guard.").
During this era, many institutions failed to provide inmates with written disciplinary rules. See Special
Project, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA.
L. REV. 919, 955 (1974). When written rules were present, many were vague, giving staff the power to define
them at their fancy. Wick, supra, at 311. Few, if any, procedural safeguards accompanied the adjudication of
alleged offenses. For instance, in Virginia's prisons, disciplinary sanctions were handed out "on the basis of a
single, unreviewed report of a guard." Philip J. Hirschkop & Michael A. Milleman, The Unconstitutionality
of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 811 (1969). One commentator wrote of two minute perfunctory ceremo-
nies. Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relationship Between the Inmate and
the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 731 n.16 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967) ("[Clourts will not interfere with the
conduct, management, and disciplinary control of this type of institution except in extreme cases."); United
States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("[I]t is unthinkable that the
judiciary should take over the operation of... prisons."); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951)
("[Ciourts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the various institutions .... ); Sarshik v.
Sanford, 142 F.2d 676, 676 (10th Cir. 1944) ("The courts have no function to superintend the treatment of
prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there.") (citation
omitted).
The "hands-off" policy rested on several rationales, including: (1) judges lacked expertise in penal
matters; (2) principles of federalism prohibited review of state prison issues by federal judges; (3) judicial
review would undermine the authority of correctional staff; and (4) prisoner complaints did not address rights,
only privileges, which could be given and taken at the will of correctional staff. See Robertson, Impartiality,
supra note 11, at 304-05.
Additional commentary regarding the "hands-off" policy is found in Eugene Barkin, The Emergence of
Correctional Law and the Awareness of Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669, (1966); Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963); Martin W. Spector, Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985, 986-87 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 715 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom., Gutierrez v.
Department of Public Safety, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1972);
Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 221 (D.S.C. 1973); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 115 (S.D.
Iowa 1973), affd, 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1082 (M.D. Fla.
1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992
(1974); Collins v. Hancock, 354 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D.N.H. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp.
767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
Several important forces in American corrections led to the repudiation of the "hands-off' policy: (1)
the growing assertiveness of inmates; (2) the advent of a prisoners' rights bar, (3) the riot at Attica prison; (4)
the notion that courts have a special duty to protect the rights of powerless minorities. SHELDON KRANTz &
LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, COmCnONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 267 (1991).
The demise of the "hands-off' policy brought a rapid expansion of prisoners' rights. Many commen-
tators examined the changes brought by this new era. See, e.g., Daryl R. Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as
Constitution-Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119 (1979); Michael S. Feldberg,
4
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Sostre v. Rockefeller 7 swept aside the long established policy of judicial non-
involvement to hold that significant punishments, including inmate Sostre's,
triggered procedural safeguards. 8
The Sostre decision foreshadowed the emergence of a liberty-defining
standard based on the magnitude of the injury visited upon claimants. In 1970,
the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly9 that a "grievous loss" arising
from the termination of welfare benefits triggered procedural safeguards." Two
years later, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer2" held that revocation of a parol-
ee's conditional liberty also "inflicts a 'grievous loss"' and thus merits proce-
dural safeguards.5 Lower federal courts subsequently applied the grievous loss
test directly to prison matters.'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ignored the grievous loss test when it first
addressed the nature of liberty in prison in the 1974 decision of Wolff v.
McDonnell.24 In Wolff, Nebraska prison officials had stripped an inmate of
accumulated good conduct time for his alleged violations of a prison rule.'
The Court held that the inmate had been deprived of a liberty interest because
the state had "created the right to good [conduct] time," a right of "real sub-
stance... within Fourteenth Amendment liberty .... 6 The Court cryptically
attributed its novel analysis to Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,27
which held that the dismissal of a college professor did not require procedural
safeguards unless state law gave him assurance of continued employment.'
Comment, Confronting The Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367 (1977); Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 14, at 811; Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971); Gary R. Terrill & Terrill
L. Unruh, Note, Eighth Amendnent Challenges to Conditions of Confinement: State Prison Reform by Federal
Judicial Decree, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 288 (1979).
17. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in part, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972).
18. Sostre, 312 F. Supp. at 872.
19. 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
20. See id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
21. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
22. Id. at 482.
23. See, e.g., Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F.
Supp. 1062, 1082 (M.D. Fla. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974); Collins v. Hancock, 354 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D.N.H. 1973); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 652 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781 (N.D. Cal.
1971), modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (N.D.N.Y.
1970).
24. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
25. See id at 533 n.ll. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DICTIONARY
OF CRI'tNAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 98 (2d ed. 1981).
[Good conduct time is] ... the amount of time deducted from time to be served in prison on a given
sentence(s) and/or under correctional agency jurisdiction, at some point after a prisoner's admission
to prison, contingent upon good behavior and/or awarded automatically by application of a statute or
regulation.
Id.
26. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
28. See id. at 577.
1996]
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In the 1976 decision of Meachum v. Fano,29 the Court further clarified the
concept of inmate liberty.3 Citing Roth, Justice White's majority opinion re-
pudiated the grievous loss test, explaining that "the determining factor is the na-
ture of the interest involved rather than its [own] weight."'" The Court asserted
that the Wolff decision had implicitly discarded the grievous loss test when it
looked to state law as the basis of a liberty interest in accruing good conduct
time. 2 The Court also contended that the grievous loss test invited judicial
oversight of the routine, day-to-day management of state prisons, an outcome
deemed "not the business of federal judges."33
The Meachum Court postulated that inmate liberty arose from two sources.
First, the Due Process Clause provided inmates with a residuum of liberty
which protects them from practices and/or conditions that fall outside "the nor-
mal limits or range of custody .... .' Second, states created liberty interests
by conditioning the exercise of penal authority "upon the occurrence of speci-
fied events."35 The Court concluded that the respondent's transfer to another,
less amenable prison did not transgress a liberty interest arising from either
source.
36
The Court elaborated upon the concept of state-created liberty in its 1983
decision of Hewitt v. Helms.37 In Hewitt, Pennsylvania prison authorities
placed the petitioner in administrative segregation to protect the staff and other
inmates. The petitioner asserted that his segregation denied him a liberty in-
terest. 9 Ruling that prison officials had curtailed the petitioner's state-created
liberty, the Court, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, deconstructed a state
regulation pertaining to the uses of administrative segregation:
[I]n this case the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] has gone beyond
simple procedural guidelines. It has used language of an unmistakably
mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures "shall," "will," or
"must" be employed and that administrative segregation will not occur
29. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
30. See id. at 223-29.
31. Id. at 224.
32. See id. at 226.
33. Id. at 228-29.
34. Id. at 225.
35. Id. at 226-27.
36. See id. at 228. See also, Thomas 0. Sargentich, Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due
Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405, 431-39 (1977) (comparing Meachum's ap-
proach to "grievous loss" jurisprudence).
37. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
38. Id. at 463. As used in Hewitt, "administrative segregation" denoted all non-punitive uses of segregat-
ed housing, including protective custody. See id. at 463 n.1. See also CORRECTONAL LAW PROJECT, AMEIu-
CAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MODEL CORRECTIONAL RuLEs AND REGULATIONS 1 (1979).
Administrative segregation is a level of custody into which an inmate may be classified as a result of
a determination that he presents a substantial risk to the security or order of the institution, the safety
of that inmate or others and, therefore, requires separation from the general institution population and
strict supervision in a highly structured, controlled setting.
Id.
39. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 464.
[Vol. 32:39
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absent specified substantive predicates -viz., "the need for control," or
"threat of a serious disturbance."
4
Later renamed "negative implication jurisprudence, ' 4' Hewitt's methodol-
ogy for identifying state-created liberty gained wide acceptance among federal
courts in the years separating the Hewit and Sandin decisions.42 The resulting
case law posited that a liberty interest arose whenever a state directive created
the "negative implication" that disciplinary sanctions or other adverse changes
in one's confinement would not occur unless "substantive predicates" were
satisfied. 43
Im. SANDIN V. CONNER
A. The Facts
Hawaiian prison authorities charged inmate DeMont Conner with violating
institutional rules while being strip searched." During his subsequent disciplin-
ary hearing, the hearing officer refused Conner's request to present witnesses
and found him guilty of the charged offense. He received a sentence of thirty
days in disciplinary segregation.45
Inmate Conner later brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.' Conner's claims included denial of procedural due process at his
disciplinary hearing.47 The federal district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the prison authorities.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court, concluding that state regulations had granted inmates a liberty
40. Id. at 471-72.
41. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995).
42. See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 470 (1989); Board of Par-
dons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-79 (1987); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Newell v.
Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir. 1991); Russ v.
Young, 895 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990); Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1989);
McQueen v. Tabah, 839 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1988); Lewis v. Thigpen, 767 F.2d 252, 262 (5th Cir.
1985); Hayes v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1985); Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493, 1502-03
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. See supra note 42 (citing pre-Sandin caselaw). See generally Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty:
The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482
(1984) (examining state-created liberty).
44. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Section 1983 lay dormant until Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), partially overruled by, Monell v. De-
partment of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), in which the Court held that misuse of state power could
be subject to a federal remedy even when state remedies were not exhausted. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. Not
until Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), did the Supreme Court hear a § 1983 lawsuit brought by inmates.
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interest in not being arbitrarily confined to disciplinary segregation.49 The
court discerned this liberty interest through negative implication jurisprudence.
Hawaii's administrative rules contained "explicitly mandatory language" direct-
Cing prison staff not to convict an inmate of a rules violation unless certain
"substantive predicates" were satisfied. °
B. The Holding
The Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner ' broke with established case law
and abandoned Hewitt's grammatically based approach to identifying state-
created liberty. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who also wrote for the Court in Hewitt,
authored the Court's opinion. The Chief Justice faulted negative implication
jurisprudence for "creat[ing] disincentives for [s]tates to codify prison manage-
ment procedures" in order to avoid burdensome procedural safeguards. 2 Fur-
thermore, the Court blamed negative implication jurisprudence for leading to
"the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons
[which the Court had sought to avoid in Hewitt.]"'53
The Sandin Court then propounded its own liberty-defining standards. The
first standard was a reaffirmation that liberty arises directly from the Due Pro-
cess Clause to protect inmates from conditions and practices which the Court
variously described as "exceeding the sentence in... an unexpected manner,"
"[outside] the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law,"
or "[resulting in] a dramatic departure from the basic conditions [of the sen-
tence]." 4 The Court first identified the Due Process Clause as a source of lib-
erty in Meachum.' In several subsequent decisions, including Hewitt, the
Court reiterated that liberty interests inhere in the Due Process Clause itself,6
but only twice found those interests to be affected by state action.
The Sandin Court's departure from Hewitt addressed the nature of state-
created liberty interests. Whereas Hewitt identified state-created liberty through
"substantive predicates" and "mandatory language,"'58 the Sandin Court used
the "ordinary incidents of prison life" to both limit the boundaries of prison due
process and to give symmetry to liberty-defining standards. Having character-
ized the liberty inhering in the Due Process Clause as a protection from condi-
49. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1463-66 (9th Cir. 1993).
50. See id.
51. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
52. Id. at 2299.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2300-01.
55. 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976).
56. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-
94 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
57. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (involuntary consumption of psychotropic drugs); Vitek, 445
U.S. at 493-94 (involuntary transfer to mental hospital).
58. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
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tions and practices that fall outside these "ordinary incidents," 9 the Court de-
limited state-created liberty to protection against "atypical and significant hard-
ships" found within these "ordinary incidents." Chief Justice Rehnquist added
that state-created liberty interests "will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint." 61
The Chief Justice next addressed whether inmate Conner's disciplinary
segregation affected liberty created by the Due Process Clause or state law. The
Court concluded that all disciplinary sanctions fall within the "expected parame-
ters" of a prison sentence and thus held that inmate Conner's punishment failed
to impinge upon the liberty inhering in the Due Process Clause.62 Since inmate
Conner's disciplinary segregation fell short of imposing an "atypical [and]
significant deprivation," '63 the Court found no deprivation of state-created liber-
ty. Chief Justice Rehnquist reached this conclusion after comparing the condi-
tions of inmate Conner's confinement in disciplinary segregation with three
other housing areas at his prison: administrative segregation, protective custody,
and the general population.' While the Court viewed the inmate's subjective
expectations as "provid[ing] some evidence that the conditions suffered were
expected within the contour of the actual sentence imposed," the Court held to
an objective standard of what the inmate should have anticipated when impris-
oned.' In inmate Conner's case, all major forms of non-disciplinary housing
imposed restrictions like those in disciplinary segregation.'
Lastly, the Court rejected inmate Conner's argument that his disciplinary
record would diminish the likelihood of being paroled and the realization of the
conditional liberty enjoyed by a parolee. 7 While Chief Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged that disciplinary violations are relevant considerations in parole
release, he characterized their impact as "simply too attenuated to invoke the
procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause" given the "myriad of [other]
considerations" relevant to such decisions.
59. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2293-2301 (1995).
60. Id. at 2300.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 2301.
63. See id.
64. See id. Unlike the Hewitt decision, the Sandin Court drew a distinction between protective custody
and administrative segregation. Inmates segregated for their own protection received a protective custody clas-
sification. Segregation for all other non-disciplinary purposes was considered administrative segregation. See
generally, James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protec-
tive Custody Inmates, 56 U. CQN. L. REv. 91 (1987) (discussing constitutional issues raised by protective
custody).
65. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301 n.9.
66. See id. at 2301.
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IV. LIBERTY AFTER SANDIN V. CONNER
Prior to Sandin v. Conner, an inmate accused of disciplinary charges, how-
ever minor, stood virtually assured of procedural safeguards because "substan-
tive predicates" and "mandatory language" had become part of the text of disci-
plinary policy in virtually every state correctional system. 9 Not so after
Sandin. As illustrated by case law regarding the two most common and severe
disciplinary sanctions-segregation and loss of good conduct time-a formerly
settled area of law has been turned upside down by the Supreme Court.
A. Disciplinary Segregation
More than half of all inmates will be charged with a prison rule violation
during their term of confinement, and nearly one-third of those charged will be
removed to disciplinary segregation."0 Once placed in the "hole," inmates will
experience a prison within a prison:
Being locked in solitary means deprivation of associational rights and
removal of privileges. Inmates so disciplined may find limited shower and
exercise opportunities; food deficient in taste and calories, absence of
bedding and toilet facilities; exposure to temperature extremes due to
inadequate heat and ventilation; and extensive surveillance of their actions
(or the opposite, isolation and neglect) by security personnel.7'
69. See James E. Robertson, Judicial Review of Prison Discipline in the United States and England: A
Comparative Study of Due Process and Natural Justice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1323, 1351 n.239 (1989)
(surveying the disciplinary regulations of all fifty states' departments of corrections).
70. See STEPHAN, supra note 11, at 1-2. One commentator asserts that five to ten days is a "typical
stay." RICHARD W. SNARR, INTRODUCION TO CORRECTnONS 144 (3d ed. 1996). Lengthy periods of segrega.
tion can be meted out. For instance, in Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a nine year "term" in segregation for a host of disciplinary infractions did not constitute a
denial of substantive due process or a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 954-55. See, e.g., NEVADA DEP'T OF PRISONS, CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE 48 (May 1,
1993) (up to 36 months segregation for assaulting officer with a weapon); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF COR-
RECTIONS, INMATE GUIDE 21 (1989) (up to 24 months for assault with a weapon); WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF
CORRECIONS, W.V. PENITENTIARY RuLES AND REGULATIONS 60 (undated) (not less than two years in segre-
gation for Class I violations); WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, INmATE RULES HANDBOOK 141 (up to 1 year
in segregation for major offenses). See generally Correale F. Stevens, Comment, Punitive Segregation in State
Prisons-The Need for Definite Time Limitations, 76 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1971) (addressing the constitutionality
of lengthy confinement in segregation); Kenneth M. Cole II, Note, Constitutional Status of Solitary Confine-
ment, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 476 (1972) (same).
Disciplinary segregation is not per se cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Bono v. Saxbe, 620
F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1980); Hancock v. Unknown U.S. Marshall, 587 F.2d 377, 378-79 (8th Cir. 1978);
Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 911 (1976). Certain adverse conditions of confinement can render segregation cruel and unusual punish-
ment and thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d
Cir. 1967); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 831-32 (E.D. Ark. 1969). Egregious segregation conditions were
the norn during the era of the "hands-off' policy. See generally Richard G. Singer, Confining Solitary Con-
finement: Constitutional Arguments for a "New Penology," 56 IOwA L. REV. 1251 (1971) (exposing unconsti-
tutional conditions).
71. RICHARD HAwKINS & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEMS 413 (1989). The "hole" is
prison slang for disciplinary segregation. BENTLEY & CORBETr, supra note 11, at 10. Despite the hardships of
disciplinary segregation, inmates could expect far worse in an earlier era.
Even though being placed in the "hole" is still a dreadful experience, it is much more humane today
than in the past. The "hole" in the past had no bed, mattress or light and a drain hole in the center of
the floor that was utilized as a toilet. A person placed in this type of "hole" would not see daylight
10
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These hardships are compounded by institutional regulations barring inmates
confined to disciplinary segregation from earning good conduct time 2
Given Sandin's categorical assertion that "[d]iscipline by prison offi-
cials... falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a
court of law," a it is quite unlikely that disciplinary segregation for even an ex-
tended period deprives inmates of the liberty inhering in the Due Process
Clause. Two contrasting opinions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, one
before and the other after Sandin, illustrate the adverse impact of the Supreme
Court's new jurisprudence. Prior to Sandin, the Seventh Circuit in Rowe v.
DeBruyn74 held that a confinement in disciplinary segregation for one year ran
afoul of the liberty emanating from the Due Process Clause.75 The court rea-
soned that a year in segregation visited "consequences ... that are qualitatively
different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted
of [a] crime."76 After Sandin, however, the same court in Whitford v.
Boglino' stated that Sandin "calls Rowe's reasoning into question" in that Jus-
tice Rehnquist implied that disciplinary sanctions per se fall "within the expect-
ed scope of a prison sentence." '
Most inmates facing disciplinary segregation will not fare much better
under Sandin's method for identifying state-created liberty. Recall that this
method juxtaposes the "duration" and "degree" of segregated confinement with
other forms of housing, particularly protective custody and administrative segre-
gation.79 The latter share much in common with disciplinary segregation, mak-
ing it quite unlikely that conditions in disciplinary segregation will be judged
"atypical." Indeed, all three types of segregated housing separate their residents
from the general prison population and impose severe restrictions on inmate
movement, visitation, work, and programming."0
for weeks at a time.
Id.
72. Thus, time spent in segregation is referred to as "dead time." BENTLEY & CORBETr, supra note 11,
at 28.
73. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301. Pre-Sandin case law also held that disciplinary segregation did not de-
prive inmates of liberty arising from the Due Process Clause itself. See Layton v. Wolff, 516 F. Supp. 629,
634 (D. Nev. 1981); see also Domegan v. Fair, 603 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Mass. 1985); McGhee v. Belisle,
501 F. Supp. 189, 190-91 (E.D. La. 1980).
74. 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994).
75. See id. at 1053.
76. Id. (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)).
77. 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 533. But the court did leave open the possibility that "extreme terms of segregation" could
deprive this type of liberty. Id. The significance of extended periods of segregation on inmate liberty is exam-
ined infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
79. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995).
80. The American Correctional Association warns of the "serious consequences which generally accom-
pany a placement in administrative segregation (e.g., an inmate's loss of a substantial degree of liberty and the
loss of access to most facilities and programs available to the general population)...." CORRECTIONAL LAW
PROJECr, supra note 38, at 6. See Robertson, supra note 64, at 125 (discussing similarities and differences be-
tween disciplinary segregation and protective custody).
1996]
11
Robertson: The Decline of Negative Implication Jurisprudence: Procedural Fai
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Comparisons between segregation and the general prison population are
also unlikely to satisfy the Court's criteria for state-created liberty. In Higgason
v. Farely,"' an inmate juxtaposed these two housing arrangements when com-
plaining about his diminished access to prison programs because of his segre-
gated status. 2 Nonetheless, the court found that he had failed to satisfy the
"atypical and significant hardship" test advanced by the Supreme Court."
Not surprisingly, lower federal courts have uniformly held that short stays
in segregation are not "atypical" punishments and thus fall outside the protec-
tion of state-created liberty. 4 The decision in Williams v. Ramos" is illustra-
tive. In Williams, the inmate-petitioner complained of being confined in disci-
plinary segregation virtually around-the-clock for nineteen days without most of
the amenities given to general population inmates.86 Nonetheless, the court in
Williams concluded that he lacked a state-created liberty interest.87 The court
stated, "We do not believe that his catalog of harms greatly exceeds what one
could expect from prison life generally .... . 88 The Williams decision is but-
tressed by holdings of the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that
confinement in administrative segregation does not constitute an "atypical and
significant" deprivation needed for a state-created liberty interest.89
Federal courts are thus far divided over the impact of exceptionally long
periods of segregated confinement on state-created liberty. In Carter v.
Carriero,"° the trial court rejected the plaintiff's contention that a disciplinary
penalty of 270 days in segregation constituted an "atypical and significant hard-
ship."9' The court explained that the plaintiff could have been confined in ad-
ministrative segregation for an equally long period and under similar condi-
tions.' On the other hand, the district court in Lee v. Coughlin93 ruled that a
81. 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1996).
82. See id. at 809.
83. Id. at 809-10.
84. See, e.g., Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1995) (19 days); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59
F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (14 days); Sehmelzer v. Norfleet, 903 F. Supp. 632, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (11
days); Clark v. Neal, 890 F. Supp. 345, 350-51 (D. Del. 1995) (8 days); Jackson v. Keane, No. 93 Civ. 6453,
1995 WL 622593, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1995) (14 days); Kozlek v. Papo, No. 94 Civ. 1429, 1995 Wl
479410, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1995) (10 days).
Inmates segregated during the investigation of alleged disciplinary violations are also outside the pro-
cedural safeguards surrounding state-created liberty. See, e.g., Eastman v. Walker, 895 F. Supp. 31, 35
(N.D.N.Y. 1995); Uzzell v. Scully, 893 F. Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Indeed, administrative segregation
per se is not "atypical." Uzzell, 893 F. Supp. at 263 ("[The Sandin decision] 'sound[ed] the death knell' for
claims alleging that the imposition of keeplock [administrative segregation] necessarily entitles inmates to a
liberty interest....") (quoting Winters v. Warden, No. 95 C 3535, 1995 WL 382505, at *3 (N.D. I11. June
19, 1995)).
85. 71 F.3d 1246 (7th Cir. 1995).
86. See id. at 1249.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300);
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300).
90. 905 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
91. Id. at 104 (quoting Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300).
92. See id. Indeed, this rationale would permit summary disciplinary confinement for the duration of
one's sentence in that some inmates segregated for non-disciplinary reasons, such as snitches and child mo-
lesters, may never be safely released from segregation. See Robertson, supra note 64, at 102 (footnote omit-
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penalty of 376 days in segregation must be accompanied by due process safe-
guards.94 Without further explanation, the trial judge decreed, "[P]laintiff has
sufficiently alleged a [state-created] liberty interest, even under the new light of
Sandin."
95
B. Good Conduct Time
Many inmates are charged with rule violations that typically call for the
loss of some good conduct time.96 Indeed, major offenses can result in the for-
feiture of months, if not years, of accumulated good conduct timeY Inmates
most fear this sanction because it extends their incarceration.98 Nonetheless,
good conduct time cannot be counted among the liberty interests arising directly
from the Due Process Clause. Providing no explanation other than a citation to
Wolff v. McDonnell, the Sandin Court categorically stated that "the Due Process
Clause itself does not create a liberty interest in credit for good behav-
ior .... .99
On the other hand, depriving inmates of earned good conduct time invari-
ably extends a prison stay and thus impacts "freedom from restraint," the touch-
stone of state-created liberty under Sandin.to Furthermore, a reading of Wolff
suggests that a state-created liberty interest in accumulated good conduct time
arises whenever state law authorizes its deprivation for misconduct.' Accord-
ted) ("Child molesters, 'short eyes' in prison argot, represent the 'lowest, most despicable kind of criminal.'
Like alleged informants ["snitches"], child molesters confront a presumptive threat of assault."). Furthermore,
once inmates are housed in protective custody they are stigmatized as "unmanly" and for that reason alone
can never leave. RICHARD A. McGEE, ET AL., THE SPECIAL MANAGEMENT INMATE 5 (1985).
93. 902 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
94. See id. at 431.
95. Id.
96. See STEPHAN, supra note 11, at 1, 7 (explaining that of the 1.5 reported violations per inmate, 25%
of the sanctions are loss of good conduct time).
97. There are no empirical studies revealing the average or median amount of good time that is lost by
virtue of disciplinary misconduct. Some sanctions can be severe: Rideau and Wikberg tell of a Louisiana
inmate who lost twenty-eight years of good conduct time following a prison escape! See WILBERT RIDEAU &
RON NVIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES 115 (1992).
Prison regulations typically provide disciplinary officers with considerable discretion in determining
the amount of good conduct time that is to be taken. See, e.g., ALABAMA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, ADMIN.
REG. 403, ANNEX B, DISCIPLINARY HEARING PROCEDURES FOR MAJOR AND MINOR VIOLATIONS 1 (June 17,
1992) (up to all earned good time); ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES OF DIscPLInE, Appendix A
(March 1986) (loss of all good conduct time recommended for most serious offenses); COLORADO DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, CODE OF PENAL DISCIPLINE 41 (rev. ed. 1984) (up to 45 days for most serious offenses); DEL-
AWARE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROCEDURE MANUAL: RULES OF CONDUCT, Proce-
dure No. 4.2, 15-16 (Nov. 23, 1992) (up to all good time for major offenses); KANSAS DEP'T OF CORREC-
TIONS, INMATE RULE BOOK, 44-12-301, 29 (April 20, 1992) (up to 6 months loss of good time for most seri-
ous offenses); NEVADA DEP'T OF PRISONS, CODE OF PENAL DISCIPLINE 47 (May 1, 1993) (120 or more days
for major violations); NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PRISON, MANUAL FOR THE GUIDANCE OF INMATES 58 (1992)
(no more than 100 days); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE GUIDE 21 (1989) (forfeiture of
all good time for murder and voluntary manslaughter); ViRGINIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF INSTI-
TUTIONS, DIVISION OPERATING PROCEDURE 861, INMATE DISCIPLINE 10 (April 1, 1992) (up to 90 days).
98. See Jacob & Sharma, supra note 11, at 11.
99. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995). Pre-Sandin case law had reached the same conclu-
sion regarding the impact of losing good time on liberty emanating directly from the Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 1984); Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir.
1984); Bills v. Henderson, 446 F. Supp. 967, 973 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
100. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
101. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974):
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ingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. Maynard"°2 observed
that "[ift is well settled 'that an inmate's liberty interest in his earned good time
cannot be denied' without the minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ''I °3
However, no procedural safeguards are needed when a disciplinary sanc-
tion merely precludes the opportunity to earn good conduct time.3 4 The deci-
sion in Luken v. Scott °5 is illustrative. In Luken, prison officials placed the
appellant in administrative segregation which prevented him from accumulating
the good conduct time needed to be eligible for parole release."° The appel-
lant argued that segregated confinement would ultimately deny him state-created
liberty by delaying his release from prison via parole."° The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, observing that the opportunity to acquire good conduct time does not
inevitably lead to its accumulation given the vagaries of inmate conduct.'
The court found support for its position in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in Sandin by stating:
In Sandin, the [Supreme] Court rejected a similar argument, noting that
[inmate] Conner's confinement in disciplinary segregation would not
"inevitably" affect the duration of his sentence since the decision to re-
lease a prisoner on parole "rests on a myriad of considerations." Indeed,
the Court concluded that the possibility that Conner's confinement in
disciplinary segregation would affect when he was ultimately released
from prison "is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees
of the Due Process Clause."' 9
V. COMMON LAW LIBERTY AND SANDIN
Justice Story, writing about English common law, observed that "[o]ur
ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birth-
right .... . 11 o Indeed, in many respects the American Revolution was a con-
servative revolution fought to preserve the common law and the rights it postu-
lated:
[Tihe State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanc-
tion authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appro-
priate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause ....
102. 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 1444-55 (quoting Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Ponte v.
Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985))) (emphasis supplied). See Uzzell v. Scully, 893 F. Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (indicating in dicta that loss of good conduct time, unlike keeplock, deprives state-created liberty).
104. See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th
Cir. 1995).
105. 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995).
106. See id. at 192-93.
107. See id. at 193.
108. See id.
109. Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995)) (citations omitted).
110. Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
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It was ... the birthright of free men, a precious inheritance, perverted by
the British under George I, but still a vital reality. One rhetorical pillar
of the men of 1776 was that common law embodied fundamental norms
of natural law. The first Continental Congress, in 1776, adopted a Decla-
ration of Rights; it declared that the colonies were "entitled to the com-
mon law of England" ....
Accordingly, the original meaning given the liberty protected by the due
process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments mirrored the com-
mon law notion of liberty. Charles Shattuck, in his seminal article on liberty's
"true scope and meaning,"" 2 concluded that the Due Process Clauses are
"mere copies of the thirty-ninth article of the Magna Carta ... .""' Citing
Blackstone, he observed that "liberty" in the Magna Carta meant "freedom from
restraint of the person.""' 4
Imprisonment has changed drastically since Blackstone's time when pris-
ons operated as semi-private institutions, with inmates paying fees to their jail-
ers."' In particular, "[1little attempt was made to regulate the day-to-day life
of prisoners at this time .... Prisoners were, with few exceptions, allowed to
wander freely within the prison and could spend the day in idle pursuits as they
wished."' 16 Hence, when eighteenth-century inmates lost their common law
liberty, they experienced only limited restrictions. Thus, their extensive freedom
of movement can hardly be compared to the major restraints that modem in-
mates face when segregated for disciplinary reasons.
The Sandin Court implicitly modeled constitutional liberty on its common
law counterpart when it observed that liberty interests "will be generally limited
to freedom from restraint.... .""7 The Court's mistake came not in embrac-
ing the common law definition of liberty but in its failure to apply it in a man-
ner consistent with what one English commentator called the "liberal and indi-
vidualistic bias of the common law .. . .""' This "bias" calls for a broad
reading of "freedom from restraint" in institutional settings: a lawful conviction
should permit only those restraints on liberty consistent with mass living and
essential custodial functions affecting general population inmates." 9 Further
111. LAWRENCE_ M. FRIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1973). See also MORTON J.
HOROWrrZ, TIHE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 5 (1977) (noting the "persistent appeals
to the common law in the constitutional struggles leading up to the American revolution").
112. Charles Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and
State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITrIONAL
LAW 185 (Association of American Law Schools 1938).
113. Id. at 195.
114. Id. See also Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REv. 431, 440 (1926) ("[L]iberty" found in Due Process Clauses embraced common law definition of liberty,
i.e., "the right to have one's person free from physical restraint.").
115. CHmISTOPHER HARDING ET AL., IMPRISONMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES 83-96 (1985); FRANK
McLYNN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 294 (1991).
116. HARDING, supra note 115, at 91. See also J. M. BEATrE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND
1660-1800, at 291 (1986) ("The absence of minute control over the daily lives of prisoners ... .
117. 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995).
118. T. R. S. Allen, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44
CAMBRIDGE LJ. 111, 119 (1985).
119. People go to prison as punishment, not for punishment. Consequently, sentencing in general and
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restrictions, including disciplinary segregation and loss of good conduct time,
threaten this residuum of liberty.
The approach taken by English courts is enlightening. They, too, once
practiced a "hands-off' policy.' But in R. v. Hull Prison Bd. of Visitors, ex
parte St. Germain,2 1 the Court of Appeal led English courts into a new
era." Like the Sandin decision, the St. Germain case addressed whether an
inmate accused of a prison rule violation is entitled to procedural safe-
guards."as Lord Justice Shaw's influential opinion posited that inmates, de-
spite their convictions and incarceration, retained common law "residuary
rights" worthy of judicial protection. 4 A subsequent ruling by a lower, divi-
sional court delineated trial-type procedures arising from natural justice,s the
English common law counterpart of due process, which must precede depriva-
tions of liberty."a
V. CONCLUSION
Early commentary on negative implication jurisprudence argued that an-
choring state-created liberty on "substantive predicates" and "mandatory lan-
guage" created a perverse incentive for departments of corrections to jettison
incarceration specifically should be guided by the presumption that government should pursue its penal objec-
tives in a manner that imposes the least restrictions on constitutional rights. As Professor Fogel writes, "All
the rights accorded free citizens consistent with mass living and the execution of a sentence restricting free-
dom of movement should follow a prisoner into prison." DAVID FOGEL, "... WE ARE LIVING PROOF... "
33 (2d ed. 1979). See Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of
Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 COR-
NELL L. REV. 51 (1972) (doctrine of least restrictive alternative as it applies to sentencing). See generally
Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VANe. L. REV. 971 (1974) (exploring how the doctrine of least restric-
tions applies to legislation).
120. See Becker v. Home Office, 2 All E.R. 676, 682 (C.A. 1972) ("If the courts were to entertain actions
by disgruntled prisoners, the [prison] governor's life would be made intolerable."); Arbon v. Anderson, 1 All
E.R. 154, 156-57 (K.B. 1943) ("It would be fatal to all discipline in prison if the governors and warders had
to perform their duty always with the fear of an action ... .
121. 1 All E.R. 701 (C.A. '1979).
122. Writing in 1993, two English commentators concluded that "ihere has been a complete overhaul of
the prison disciplinary system [since the demise of the 'hands-off policy of English courts]." STEPHEN
LvINOSTONE & Tim OwEN, PRISON LAW 308 (1993) (examining rights of inmates in England). These com-
mentators also suggest that judicial intervention in England, as in the United States, spurred the growth of a
bureaucratic model of prison management practice. Id. at 309. See generally James E. Robertson, Prison
Litigation in England, 26 CIM. L. BULL. 246 (1990) (overview of English prison law).
123. See St. Germain, 1 All E.R. at 702.
124. See id. at 716 (Shaw, L.L).
125. See R. v. Hull Prison Bd. of Visitors, ex parte St. Germain, 3 All E.R. 545 (Div'l Ct. 1979). A
comparison of procedural safeguards in English and American prisons appears in Robertson, supra note 69, at
1363-83.
The expansion of prisoners' rights in England, like the United States, has been piecemeal and at a
halting pace. See, e.g., Hague v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, 3 All E.R. 733, 746 (H.L. 1991) (con-
finement under "intolerable conditions" does not present an action for false imprisonment); R. v. Parole Bd., 3
All E.R. 828, 828-29 (Div'l Ct. 1990) (denial of parole does not require giving of reasons to applicant).
126. See H. W. R. WADE, ADMmNISTRATIVE LAW 13 (5th ed. 1982) ("Natural justice plays the same part
in British law as does 'due process of law' in the Constitution ...."); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative
Procedure and Natural Law, 28 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 169, 191 (1953) ("Liberation is thus seen to depend
upon certain unwritten legal principles, which are required by man's sense of fair play . . ").
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administrative regulations that limited the discretionary power of line staff.27
However, this did not come to pass. A review of disciplinary policies" re-
vealed the dominance of what Max Weber called bureaucratic, rational law-
"explicit, abstract, intellectually calculable rules and procedure."'2 9 In turn,
pre-Sandin case law identified abundant state-created liberty interests amid
statutes, 3  prison rules,' prison manuals,' and inmate handbooks.
3
Despite Hewitt's articulated policy of deference to prison staff,"' nega-
tive implication jurisprudence had the unintended effect of expanding prison
due process to include a host of matters once considered outside the scope of
judicial review. The Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner attempted
to reverse this process. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Sandin exemplifies purposive, instrumentalist jurisprudence that has long been
the bane of conservative jurists.3 5 The Chief Justice redefined the nature of
state-created liberty interests with one purpose in mind-to lessen judicial in-
volvement in our overcrowded and violent state prison systems by placing
major disciplinary sanctions largely outside the reach of procedural safe-
guards. 3
6
The Court's decision in Sandin is misguided. There is no empirical evi-
dence that procedural safeguards harm prison discipline. 37 In fact, procedural
127. See Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims of Procedural Due Process, in DUE PRO-
CESS 126, 134 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1977) ("A procedural due process right so derived might seem
to carry the seeds of its own destruction... ").
128. See Robertson, supra note 69, at 1351.
129. JAiEs M. INVERARrrY ET AL., LAW AND Socmry 104-06 (1983). Correctional agencies have experi-
enced extensive bureaucratization since the decline of the "hands-off" policy. In large measure, bureaucratiza-
tion was a response to inmate lawsuits. Professor Jacobs writes that "Ritigation created pressures to establish
rational operating procedures, to clarify lines of authority, and to focus responsibility." See JAMES B. JACOBS,
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 54 (1983). Similarly, Hawkins and Alpert observe: "Pro-
viding due process to prisoners contributed to the bureaucratization of the prison." HAWKINS & ALPERT, su-
pra note 71, at 430. Previously, wardens ran their prisons like fiefdoms. Fox, supra note 14, at 13. James B.
Jacob's social history of Illinois' Stateville Prison remains the seminal examination of the various phases of
prison administration during this century. See JAMsS B. JACOBS, STATEVILLE (1977). For a study of contem-
porary variations in prison management, see JoHN J. DIIULIo, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS (1987). Nonetheless,
prisons are not free of arbitrariness. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 1014 ("[A]lthough some of the discretion
[of prison staff] has been restricted, a great deal of arbitrariness and discretion still exists .... .
130. See, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-79 (1987); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
487-90 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1979).
131. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 (1983); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 (7th
Cir. 1986).
132. See Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1980).
133. See Lewis v. Thigpen, 767 F.2d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. 459 U.S. at 472 ("Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference .....
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
135. See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE LI. 227, 228-29 (1972)
(Instrumentalism evaluates judicial decision-making by "success in effectuating a socially desirable out-
come .... ."). Instrumentalism can be contrasted to what Professor Dworkin called arguments of principle: "I
call a 'principle' a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure and economic, politi-
cal, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other
dimension of morality." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEmOUSmY 22 (1978).
136. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995).
137. The impact of judicial intervention in prisons is much debated. Engel and Rothman argue that judi-
cial intervention and the expansion of prisoners' rights has been disruptive of institutional order, endangering
both staff and imnates. See Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform: Rehabilita-
tion, Prisoners' Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413, 430-33 (1984). But their analysis is
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safeguards historically have exercised a salutary effect on the administration of
criminal justice. 31 In their absence, government decision-makers have often
underestimated the importance of fairness as a foundation for social order.
less than convincing. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on
Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTIoN 12, 19 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990) ("[W]e need a much more fine-grained analysis
before we can draw the type of casual connections Engel and Rothman make in their article.') (footnote omit-
ted). But one cannot dispute that the advent of prisoners' rights has introduced bureaucratic management into
prison management. See JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIvES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 54-55 (1983)
("Litigation created pressures to establish rational operating procedures, to clarify lines of authority, and to
focus responsibility."). See generally WAYNE N. WELSH, COUNTIES IN COURT (1995) (judicial intervention in
California's jails); LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET (1989) (judicial intervention in Alabama's
prisons).
Whereas the literature on judicial intervention in corrections has grown rapidly, there are no published
studies addressing the impact of negative implication jurisprudence. See generally Edward E. Rhine, The Rule
of Law, Disciplinary Practices, and Rahway State Prison: A Case Study in Judicial Intervention and Social
Control, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (studying
disciplinary practices at New Jersey's Rahway State Prison).
138. See CORRECTIONAL LAW PRomc, supra note 38, at 26 ("The fairness of prison discipline, not only
in actuality but as perceived by the prison population, is essential in preventing unrest and maintaining harmo-
ny within an institution.').
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